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Abstract: This paper considers railway operations in 23 European countries during 1995-
2001, where a series of reform initiatives were launched by the European Commission, and 
analyses whether these reform initiatives improved the operating efficiency of the railways. 
Efficiency is measured using Multi-directional Efficiency Analysis, which enables 
investigation of how railway reforms affect the inefficiencies of specific cost drivers. The 
main findings are that the reform initiatives generally improve operating efficiency but 
potentially differently for different cost drivers. Specifically, the paper provides clear 
empirical evidence that accounting separation is important for improving operating efficiency 
for both material and staff costs, whereas other reforms only influenced one of these factors.  
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1. Introduction 
Market opening and deregulation of public monopolies in network industries like 
transportation, telecommunication and utilities distribution has been the subject of numerous 
studies since the 1980’s, c.f. e.g. Megginson and Netter (2001). The underlying rationale has, 
among other things, been that promoting competition leads to increased operational efficiency 
and improved consumer welfare, for instance according to the contestable market hypothesis 
(Baumol et al. 1982). 
 
In the present paper we consider the organisation of railway operations in 23 European 
countries during 1995-2001; a period that witnessed a series of reform initiatives from the 
European Commission (EC) as well as specific national initiatives in some member states that 
exceeded the EC requirements. Traditionally, railways in Europe have been organised as state 
monopolies responsible for both infrastructure and services, but the reforms in question have 
aimed at market openings and the separation of operations and infrastructure management. 
Therefore, it is of interest to examine the effects of these organisational changes on the 
operating efficiencies of the railways in order to assess the reforms’ effectiveness. 
 
The efficiency of the railways is measured using so-called Multi-directional Efficiency 
Analysis (e.g. Asmild et al. 2003, Holvad et al. 2004). Multi-directional Efficiency Analysis 
(MEA), like the more widely used Data Envelopment Analysis (e.g. Charnes et al. 1978) is a 
non-parametric method capable of measuring the relative performance of production units 
considering multiple inputs and multiple outputs simultaneously. MEA however, measures 
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the improvement potential (inefficiency) in each production factor separately, which enables 
us to investigate the impact of railway reforms on the inefficiencies of specific cost drivers. 
 
A substantial constraint for undertaking benchmarking analyses for the railway sector on a 
pan-European scale has been the lack of harmonised data between countries. However, as part 
of an EC sponsored project (Study of the Financing of and Public Budget Contributions to 
Railways) NERA Economic Consulting collected a data set which represents a significant 
improvement from previous work, as much effort has been put into the preparation of 
consistent and comparable data. Data from UIC (The International Union of Railways) were 
used as the starting point, but these were subsequently compared to information provided in 
the annual reports from the national railway companies, supported by direct requests to the 
railways (UIC, various years). This process revealed gaps and inconsistencies in the UIC data 
that were amended using the additional information from the annual reports and the railway 
companies themselves. Clearly, despite these efforts, some data inconsistencies between the 
countries may still remain. 
 
We show that reform initiatives improve operating efficiency but potentially differently for 
different cost drivers. The most robust result is a strongly significant effect of accounting 
separation on both material and staff costs. Thus, this paper provides clear empirical evidence 
that accounting separation is important for improving operating efficiency.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background information about the 
railway sector in Europe. Section 3 outlines the methodology used for the performance 
assessment (MEA). In Section 4 the data used are presented. Efficiency results and 
explanatory factors are examined in Section 5 and finally Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2.  Motivation 
2.1 Railway reforms 
While the total transport demand in the European Union member states has increased 
significantly over the last decades, the shares of rail transport of both passengers and freight 
have decreased. This trend has arguably created economic, social and environmental 
problems.  
 
The reduced market shares for rail have resulted in financial difficulties for the public 
monopolies that throughout Europe had in the main been responsible for railways since the 
end of the Second World War. These monopolies were in general organised as vertically 
integrated companies with responsibility for both infrastructure management and operations, 
and often other non-rail transport services such as long-distance coach and ferry services as 
well. At the same time there has been increased recognition of the need for more sustainable 
transport, with the rail mode being seen as critical in order to achieve this (European 
Commission, 2001).  
 
Therefore, railway reforms were initiated in many European countries and since 1991 the 
reform process has been taken forward through EC legislation aiming to enhance the 
competitiveness of rail transport. Key elements in the European railway reforms have been to 
promote a step-by-step market opening mainly concerning freight transport combined with 
(some degree of) vertical disintegration of infrastructure management and operation of 
services, unbundling of other railway functions, and introduction of infrastructure access 
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charging (Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans, 2004). These reforms, which enable a greater role 
for market forces, are expected to result in improved cost performance and enhanced 
customer focus (European Commission, 1996). Thereby the reforms should provide a basis 
for improvements in rail services such that the competitiveness of rail vis-à-vis other modes 
of transport is enhanced, contributing to sustainable transport as set out in the EC Transport 
White Paper (European Commission, 2001).  
 
Requirements from the EC concerning separation of infrastructure and operations were 
initially included in Directive 91/440/EC (European Commission, 1991) where the principle 
of accounting separation was introduced. Subsequently, Directive 2001/12/EC (European 
Commission, 2001) provided that independent organisational entities must be specified for 
transport operations and infrastructure management. This directive allows the member states 
to achieve this separation through either the organisation of distinct divisions within a single 
undertaking (the holding company model) or for the infrastructure to be managed by a fully 
separate entity. Furthermore, according to the directive, member states are required to take 
measures to ensure that the functions determining equitable and non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure are assigned to bodies that do not themselves provide any rail services.  
 
Apart from the separation of infrastructure and operations, further unbundling is also being 
implemented in the EU member states, including at least accounting separation between 
passenger and freight operations and between Public Service Obligation (PSO) activities and 
non-PSO activities. In addition, steps to ensure the independence of essential functions such 
as capacity allocation, infrastructure charging and licensing are required according to 
Directive 2001/12/EC (European Commission, 2001).  
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It should be noted that several variations of both full separation and the holding company 
model for organisation of railways exist amongst the European countries. For example, 
although Sweden, Netherlands and Britain all have adopted full separation of infrastructure 
and operations, in Britain only privately-owned railway undertakings operate on the network 
whereas in all other countries there is at least one publicly-owned company present in the 
network. For countries operating according to the holding company model (e.g. Germany, 
Italy, Switzerland, Poland and Estonia) there are also variations in the organizational set up; 
in Estonia, for example, the integrated company is majority privately owned, whereas the 
government is the only shareholder in the other countries. A few countries (France, Czech 
Republic, Finland and Slovenia) have adopted a structure in between the fully separated and 
integrated models, where separate entities are established yet some co-ordination between 
infrastructure and operations is facilitated. 
 
The main advantage of the fully separated model, as opposed to the holding company model, 
is that non-discriminatory access to the network, required for true market opening, is 
straightforward due to the lack of links between any railway operator and the infrastructure 
management. Another possible advantage of full separation is cost transparency which is 
more difficult to obtain in the holding company model, though accounting separation may at 
least partly achieve this (cf. e.g. Shires and Preston, 1999). On the other hand, full separation 
is more likely to result in various forms of coordination problems between the rail operations 
and the management of the infrastructure as opposed to the holding company model (cf. e.g. 
Cantos, 2001).  
 
In the following, variables representing various reform initiatives are tested for their influence 
on railway operating efficiency. The a priori expectations are that especially initiatives 
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leading to market opening should increase efficiency whereas the net effect on efficiency of 
the cost transparency and the possible coordination problems resulting from organisational 
separation is less obvious.  
 
2.2 Modelling considerations 
There is a substantial body of literature concerning the (levels of) technical and cost 
efficiency of railway operations, including country comparisons (see e.g. Oum and Yu 1994, 
and Oum et al. 1999). Only a few studies do, however, consider the effects of regulatory 
changes on operating efficiency, including Oum and Yu (1994), Gathon and Pestieau  (1995), 
Cantos et al. (1999), Cantos and Maudos (2001), and Friebel et al. (2005). While these studies 
generally find efficiency improvements from railway reforms, they use different 
methodological approaches and consider different aspects.  
 
Gathon and Pestieau (1995) decompose efficiency into managerial and regulatory components 
and argue that deregulation increases efficiency due to management autonomy. Cantos and 
Maudos (2001) suggest that while productivity increases, the financial performance of the 
railway companies deteriorate during the period of deregulation. Friebel et al. (2005) pose the 
argument that the outcome of reforms depends on sequencing and that they should be 
introduced in a stepwise manner rather than in a combined package. Moreover, they challenge 
the supposed positive effect of full separation in the specific case of the railway industry.  
 
Oum and Yu (1994) examine the relative efficiency of 19 mainly European railway 
companies for the period 1978-89 using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). In a second stage analysis, Tobit regression is used to provide explanations of the 
variation in efficiency level. The results indicate that the extent of public subsidies has a 
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significantly negative effect on efficiency whereas greater managerial autonomy tends to 
increase efficiency.  
 
DEA is also used by Cantos et al. (1999) who subsequently use Malmquist Indices to 
investigate productivity changes over time and their decomposition. Their main findings are 
that productivity improvements are mainly caused by technical change and that technical 
changes increase with the degree of autonomy and financial independence, where the latter 
conclusion concurs with that of Gathon and Pestieau (1995) but is based on a multiple output 
model. While the idea of the decomposition used by Cantos et al. (1999) is relevant, it comes 
at a cost: Since all cross-period efficiency scores have to be well-defined for calculations of 
Malmquist Indices, all inputs have to be discretionary in an input oriented model and we 
argue that an important variable like the network length is naturally non-discretionary. Hence, 
we do not here use Malmquist Indices. Furthermore, using MEA rather than DEA enables us 
to analyse the effects of the reforms on specific cost drivers as explained in Section 3 below. 
 
3. Multi-directional Efficiency Analysis (MEA) 
This section provides a brief description of the MEA methodology; for further details see e.g. 
Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999), Asmild et al. (2003) and Holvad et al. (2004). We consider 
here the input oriented version of MEA, since we are concerned with the cost efficiency of 
railway operations and we furthermore use constant returns to scale models. 
 
Let N be the set of observed production units, here railways in 23 European countries each 
year from 1995 to 2001. Let unit j∈N use m inputs xij, i = 1,…, m, to produce s outputs yrj, r = 
1,…, s. We further subdivide the inputs into discretionary and non-discretionary inputs to be 
denoted by xijD (i = 1,…,k) and xijN (i = k+1,…,m) respectively. The mathematical programs 
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used to calculate the relative input specific MEA-inefficiencies for a given unit (x0, y0) can 
now be determined as follows: First, the ideal reference point for (x0, y0) is found by solving 
the k linear programs i = 1,…, k (one for each discretionary input dimension): 
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where the notation (-i) denotes all input dimensions except dimension i.  
 
Letting (λ*, θ*i0) be the solutions to the above programs for i=1, …, k, the ideal reference plan 
for (x0, y0) is given by (θ*10, …,θ*k0). Consider next the following linear programming 
problem for (x0, y0): 
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The solution (λ*, β*0) to this program can be used to determine the benchmark selection for 
(x0, y0) and thereby the k-dimensional vector of relative (discretionary) input specific MEA-
inefficiencies for unit (x0, y0) becomes: 
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where all elements in the vectors are constrained between 0 and 1. 
 
4. Data and model 
The data used for the analysis of railway efficiencies and the impacts of reforms were 
collected as part of an EU sponsored project undertaken by NERA Economic Consulting. 
Railway statistics for all current EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland are 
available for the period 1995 – 2001 (NERA, 2004). The NERA data set represents a 
substantial effort towards ensuring data comparability between the countries as mentioned in 
the introduction. 
 
The data cover activity and resource indicators (e.g. passenger kilometres, tonne-kilometres, 
traffic units, staff and length of lines) as well as data from the income statements (e.g. 
revenue, costs and public budget contributions) and balance sheets (e.g. capital, reserves and 
debt). All monetary figures are reported in real euros (2001 prices). Data provided for each 
country concern the main state railway organisation with the exception of Britain where the 
data are aggregated from different private rail companies as the whole rail sector was 
privatised in 1993. For those countries where the industry is vertically separated regarding 
infrastructure and operations, separate data are available for the railway undertaking and the 
infrastructure manager and further information is also provided which combine the data for 
the two organisations whilst netting out financial flows between them. 
 
4.1 Definition of data used for efficiency analysis 
Based on the NERA data set, a core analytical model for the efficiency analysis will be 
specified below. This model draws on specifications from earlier studies of railway efficiency 
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(e.g. Oum and Yu, 1994) and considers the main inputs and outputs involved in railway 
production. 
 
Since one of the main goals of the reform initiatives is to create cost-consciousness in the 
railway systems, the analytical models include the two main cost components: Labour and 
material costs. Furthermore, network length is included as an indicator of capacity, but since 
it is not a decision parameter (in the short run at least) it is incorporated as a non-discretionary 
input variable.   
 
Looking at the output side, requirements for public service obligation activities means that 
physical production rather than revenues become relevant. The models therefore include 
passenger and freight train-kilometres as the two output variables. The exact definitions of the 
input and output variables are given below.      
 
Even though we consider a panel data set we have chosen to pool the data for the different 
years into one combined data set and thus all efficiencies are measured relative to one 
common frontier. If the years had been considered separately, the annual results could have 
been compared using Malmquist indices. However, as mentioned previously, the presence of 
a non-discretionary variable in our modelling framework makes this approach infeasible. 
Nevertheless, measuring all efficiencies relative to the same (pooled) frontier rather than 
annual frontiers ensures that efficiencies can be compared directly. Furthermore it should be 
noted that the subsequent analysis of the effects of reform initiatives consider changes in 
rather than levels of inefficiencies, and therefore it is of little importance whether the 
estimated benchmarks are actually attainable for the individual observations. 
 
 12
To sum up, the core analytical model comprises the following input and output variables from 
the NERA data set: 
 
• Outputs: 
o Passenger train-kilometres (in thousands): The number of kilometres travelled by 
passenger trains. 
o Freight train-kilometres (in thousands): The number of kilometres travelled by 
freight trains. 
• Discretionary Inputs:  
o Staff costs (in million euros): Following UIC’s guidelines, total staff costs 
comprise all staff remuneration, railways’ contributions towards family 
allowances, safety, social welfare, staff training, contributions to pension funds, 
and pensions paid directly by the railways after deduction of contributions by 
active staff. 
o Material purchases and external charges (in million euros):  Material costs consist 
of most operating costs which are not staff costs. Typically it includes operating 
costs incurred when constructing assets as well as maintenance costs, energy costs 
and rolling stock leasing costs.  
• Non-discretionary Input:  
o Network length. The network length refers to the length of lines in kilometres 
available for train service irrespective of the number of parallel tracks. 
 
4.2 Reform characteristics 
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The performance results from the core model specified above are in a second stage analysis 
related to the organisational structure for railways in the different countries. The analysis 
considers dummy variables for the following reform characteristics: 
 
• Accounting Separation: Indicating whether or not infrastructure and services are 
separated on an accounting basis. 
• Complete Separation: Indicating whether or not infrastructure and services are 
institutionally separated. 
• Independent Management: Indicating whether or not legislation is transposed that 
assures independent management from the government of railway companies. 
• Competitive Tendering for Passenger Services: Indicating whether or not 
competitive tendering is used to procure (some or all) passenger railway services.  
• Market Opening Freight Transport: Indicating whether or not legislation is 
transposed that allows entry of competitors and competition has developed to a 
significant extent.  
 
Information concerning these reform characteristics for each country and for each year were 
established using materials from different sources, including Driessen et al. (2006) and Nash 
and Rivera-Trujillo (2004).  
 
4.3  Final data set for efficiency analysis 
For our core model with the inputs and outputs specified above, complete data were available 
for most countries except for Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. These countries are 
therefore excluded from the analysis, resulting in 28 observations (4 countries x 7 years) 
being removed from the original data set. Furthermore, individual observations from some 
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countries had to be discarded due to either missing data points for one or more of the variables 
in certain years or in a few cases because variable values for a given year were out of line 
with the values for all other years for that country. This concerned the following 5 
observations that were subsequently also discarded from the data set: Great Britain for 1995 
due to very high staff costs in that year compared to all the other years; Netherlands for 2000 
and 2001 due to missing data for freight train kilometres; Switzerland for 1998 as a result of a 
single very high value for material purchases and external charges compared to both the 
period before and after that year and Czech Republic for 1995 caused by a very high value for 
material purchases and external charges. The final data set for the efficiency analysis 
therefore comprises 156 observations (compared to the 189 original observations including all 
countries and years). For countries that operate a vertically separated railway system, the 
observations are combined data for both infrastructure manager and railway undertaking. This 
choice of data definition facilitates comparisons between railway systems that are vertically 
separated and those that are vertically integrated. 
 
Table 1, 2 and 3 below show descriptive statistics for the input and output variables across the 
whole data set, mean values for the input and output variables for each country and the status 
of the various reform variables for each country respectively. 
 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Material purchases and external charges (million €) 1 380.19 2 336.2 35.8 10 774.3
Staff costs (million €) 1 752.55 2 568.5 30.9 12 348.6
In
pu
ts
 
Network length* (km) 8 970.30 9 984.0 274 41 573.0
Passenger train-kilometres (1000 km) 121 275.90 161 262.8 2 714 729 900
O
ut
pu
ts
 
Freight train-kilometres (1000 km) 39 131.95 51 804.6 1 048 226 900
 15
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of input and output variables.  
  
* denotes a non-discretionary input variable 
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Country 
Material purchases 
and ext. charges 
Staff 
costs 
Network 
length * 
Passenger Train-
kilometres 
Freight Train-
kilometres 
Austria 788.9 2 095.9 5 650.4 86 742.0 44 331.0
Belgium 781.6 2 342.1 3 425.3 74 331.3 17 827.1
Czech republic 498.9 608.9 9 411.5 98 166.7 43 581.8
Denmark 451.0 560.9 2 259.7 53 385.7 6 665.6
Estonia 58.5 34.0 982.3 4 061.6 4 136.6
Finland 365.8 375.0 5 856.0 26 763.1 16 696.1
France 4 155.9 7 349.2 31 104.1 351 000.1 151 273.0
Germany 10 481.7 10 226.8 38 422.9 689 688.1 212 449.7
Great Britain 5 109.6 2 537.6 16 655.7 400 814.0 50 179.6
Greece 69.8 276.8 2 401.6 15 378.9 1 564.1
Hungary 329.5 376.7 7 665.3 74 794.6 16 932.1
Ireland 126.0 149.4 1 932.6 11 104.4 4 199.6
Italy 2 379.9 5 344.6 16 062.1 253 808.6 63 938.4
Luxembourg 142.0 170.4 274.1 6 063.0 1 193.1
Netherlands 1 762.3 1 073.7 2 804.2 113 867.8 7 204.7
Norway 460.8 458.6 4 086.7 26 646.1 9 144.0
Poland 985.9 1 507.6 22 865.4 168 875.6 100 922.9
Portugal 215.9 269.6 2 920.0 32 232.7 7 930.5
Slovakia 305.7 284.1 3 664.9 37 176.1 21 823.1
Slovenia 115.6 143.2 1 205.1 11 077.9 7 315.9
Spain 833.6 1 076.3 12 300.0 126 206.3 39 330.9
Sweden 865.4 829.7 9 966.6 63 776.3 35 833.4
Switzerland 908.7 2 008.9 2 936.5 94 004.0 26 907.0
Table 2. Mean values across years for the input and output values for each country.  
  
* denotes a non-discretionary input variable 
 17
 
Country 
Accounting 
separation 
Complete 
separation 
Independent 
management
Passenger 
tendering 
Market 
opening freight 
Austria Full Not Full Not Not
Belgium             Full Not Full Not Not
Czech Full Not Not Not Full+
Denmark From 1997 From 1997 From 1999 From 2001 From 1999
Estonia Not  Not From 1997 Not From 1999
Finland Full Full Not Not Not
France Full From 1997 From 1997 Not Not
Germany Full Not Full From 1996 Full
Great Britain  Full Full Full Full Full+
Greece Not Not Not Not Not
Hungary Not Not Full Not Not
Ireland From 1996 Not Full Not Not
Italy From 1998 Not Full Not From 2001
Luxembourg Full Not Not Not Not
Netherlands Full Not Full From 1999 From 1998+
Norway From 1997 From 1999 From 1997 Not Not
Poland From 1999 Not From 2001 Not From 2000
Portugal From 1997 From 1997 From 1997 From 1999 Not
Slovakia From 1997 Not Not Not From 1998
Slovenia From 1999 Not Not Not Not
Spain From 1997 Not Full Not Not
Sweden Full Full Full Full From 1996
Switzerland From 1998 Not Full Not From 1999
Table 3.  Outline of the onset of various reforms for each country. ‘Full’ means that the 
reforms were implemented before 1995 and ‘Not’ means that reforms are still not 
implemented in 2001. 
 
+ denotes that the data series is incomplete 
 
5. Results 
The averages across the study period of the annual relative MEA inefficiencies for each 
country are shown in Figure 1 below, where the figure concern inefficiencies in material 
purchases and staff costs respectively.   
 18
 
 
It appears that there is a positive relationship between the inefficiencies on the two input 
variables, but generally with higher relative inefficiency on staff costs. Looking at the 
individual countries shows that the early reformer Great Britain is one of the countries with 
low inefficiency on especially staff costs. Other countries with overall low inefficiencies are 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia, which may be caused by 
economies of density as well as relatively low wage levels in Eastern European countries. 
Furthermore, especially the Czech Republic and Netherlands have shown substantial reform 
progression. A bit surprising is the high inefficiency for other early reformers like Germany 
and Sweden. For Germany, the relatively poor cost performance is probably caused by 
restructuring following the integration of the East and West German railways. And for 
Sweden, the poor performance may be explained by low population density and relatively 
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high wages1. These factors may also partly explain the high inefficiencies in other countries 
such as Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy2, Luxembourg, Norway and Spain. 
But all these countries, and in particular Spain, Ireland and Greece, are also countries that 
have been slow in initiating reforms. 
 
While many earlier studies have compared railway efficiencies in different countries we here, 
however, specifically focus on the changes in inefficiencies in individual countries as they 
relate to the implementation of reforms. Since there are big differences in the levels of 
inefficiency between countries, it is necessary to account for country effects when testing for 
the effects of the various reform initiates described in Section 4 above. The influence of the 
various railway reforms on the changes in inefficiencies on staff and material costs are 
analysed by use of ordinary multivariate analysis of variances controlling for country effects. 
Wilks’ lambda is used for simultaneous analysis of influence on the potential cost reductions, 
while marginal analyses are performed using standard t-tests. 
 
Table 4 below shows the estimated effects (on the inefficiencies) of the selected reform 
characteristics and the significance probabilities from the above mentioned test statistics.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1. The issue of relative wages will be analysed specifically in section 5.2 below. 
2. It should be noted, that Italy in recent years has made substantial progress towards market opening, but the 
effect is not evident within the current study period. 
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Grouping 
Variable (and counts) 
Input 
direction 
Estimate 
of effect 
(std.error) 
t-test, 
p value 
Wilks’ 
Lambda,  
p-value 
Material purchases 
and ext. charges 
-0.0462 
(0.0175) 
p=0.009** Accounting separation  
 
(with=110,without=46) Staff costs -0.0591 
(0.0206) 
p=0.005** 
p=0.011* 
Material purchases 
and ext. charges 
-0.0436 
(0.0260) 
p=0.096 Complete separation 
 
(with=39, without=117) Staff costs -0.0470 
(0.0308) 
p=0.130 
p=0.215 
Material purchases 
and ext. charges 
-0.0552 
(0.0234) 
p=0.020* Independent 
management 
 
(with=97, without=59) 
Staff costs -0.0447 
(0.0280) 
p=0.113 
p=0.067 
Material purchases 
and ext. charges 
-0.0688 
(0.0329) 
p=0.039* Passenger tendering 
 
(with=24, without=132) Staff costs -0.0714 
(0.0391) 
p=0.070 
p=0.098 
Material purchases 
and ext. charges 
-0.0280 
(0.0206) 
p=0.177 Market opening freight 
 
(with=43, without=113) Staff costs  -0.0589 
(0.0240) 
p=0.016* 
p=0.052 
Table 4. Test statistics and estimates for the effect on inefficiencies of reforms, calculated in a   
linear model controlling for country effects.  
  
P values for Wilks’ Lambda are calculated in the corresponding exact F(2,131) distribution. 
Significance on 5% and 1% level are indicated by * and ** respectively.  
 
The immediate observation from the results in Table 4 is that all coefficients are negative, 
which means that all reform initiatives reduce the cost inefficiency, i.e. improve the cost 
efficiency of operations both in terms of material purchases and staff costs. However, only 
some of the coefficients are significant: Accounting separation (for both inputs), independent 
management (for materials), passenger tendering (for materials) and market opening freight 
(for staff).     
 
Accounting separation is clearly highly significant – and for both cost drivers. Thus it appears 
that the cost transparency resulting from the accounting separation is important for improving 
the cost efficiency. It should be noted, however, that complete separation (full organisational 
disintegration of railway operations and infrastructure management) obviously implies 
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accounting separation. But since complete separation is not significant, there is no empirical 
evidence about whether complete separation results in additional benefits above and beyond 
the significant positive impact of accounting separation alone. 
 
Independent management (for materials) is also significant, confirming the expectation that 
giving the railway companies more independence from state control has a positive influence 
on performance. That independent management is only significant for material costs, and not 
for staff costs, may be explained by management being less constrained in terms of 
implementing changes regarding materials acquisition and utilization as opposed to the staff 
costs where the scope for changes may be more limited, at least in the short run, due to 
contractual factors etc. (although it should be noted that the results for staff cost improvement 
have the expected sign). 
 
Passenger tendering shows a weakly significant positive effect on material costs. This effect is 
only based on data from four countries (see Table 3) and, therefore, the generality of the result 
is questionable. Again, the effect is only significant for material cost, which also in this case is 
likely to be caused by more management flexibility regarding material costs than staff. 
Indeed, it is likely that the constraints regarding staff are even stronger concerning passenger 
transport due to e.g. political attention to ensure sufficient passenger assistance and comfort, 
less use of subcontracting and hence more staff employed as civil servants. It should be 
noticed that several countries (e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands) introduced competitive 
tendering for parts of the passenger services towards the end of the study period for which the 
effects may only emerge in the subsequent years. 
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In the case of market opening for freight, it is the effect on staff costs that is significant but 
not on material costs. As noted above staff expenditure is relatively easier to change when it 
comes to freight rather than passenger transport. Indeed, one of the main aims of the reforms 
was to improve efficiency by increasing the competitive pressure on railway companies 
especially on the freight market. 
  
5.2  Results on East-West differences 
It is obvious that two different modes of operation existed especially before the reforms 
began, namely in Eastern and Western Europe respectively. Generally the former communist 
countries in Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) have been characterised by lower (labour) productivity but also by lower wage 
levels. This is also apparent in the current dataset, where considering the ratio of staff costs to 
staff numbers clearly divides the countries in Eastern and Western Europe into two distinct 
groups. Therefore, one would expect that considering staff numbers instead of staff costs 
would change the ranking of countries based on efficiency scores3. Indeed, for the current 
data set countries like Estonia and Slovakia show considerably more inefficiency when using 
staff numbers rather than costs whereas countries such as Spain and Sweden do considerably 
better. These changes are likely to be explained by differences in wage levels.   
 
Because of the two distinct modes one might question whether the reforms have the same 
effects in Eastern and Western Europe. Still controlling for country effects, it turns out that 
there is a slight difference in the effect of market opening for freight on staff cost inefficiency 
                                                
3. Note also that when changing the model such that staff numbers are used instead of staff costs (ceteris 
paribus) all previously significant effects of reform variables remain significant and point in the same direction 
(i.e. reducing cost inefficiency). Furthermore, additional effects become significant. 
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in Eastern and Western Europe, (p=0.050). The estimated effects and standard deviations are -
0.0097 (0.0274) for Eastern Europe and -0.0964 (0.0342) for Western Europe, meaning that 
staff cost inefficiencies are reduced more in the Western part of Europe than in the Eastern 
part when introducing market opening for freight. Similar analyses of the other reform 
variables results in insignificant differences between the two parts of Europe. Effects of 
complete separation and passenger tendering were not obtainable (estimable) in the Eastern 
European countries, and consequently comparison with Western countries was not possible. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
A main finding in the current study is that all the reform initiatives have negative impacts on 
the inefficiencies on both material and staff costs, i.e. they improve operating efficiency. Not 
all of these effects are significant however. This may in part be caused by the fact that for 
some of the reforms initiatives the available data contains too few occurrences of the 
introduction of  the initiative (like in the case of passenger tendering and complete 
separation), which reduces the strengths of the statistical tests.     
 
Generally, we observe that more effects are significant for material costs than for staff costs. 
A possible explanation for this finding is that management has more flexibility for adjusting 
the acquisition and utilization of materials rather than staff, as the latter is limited by 
contractual obligations etc. Note that whether the reforms affect the two input factors 
differently can be directly analysed using the framework of MEA, whereas using e.g. DEA 
would not enable such a distinction.  
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The most robust result is the strongly significant effect of accounting separation on both 
material and staff costs. Thus, this paper provides empirical evidence that accounting 
separation is important for improving operating efficiency. The strength of the result is 
increased by the fact that many countries implemented this particular initiative during the 
study period such that the data set enables a strong statistical test for the effect of this reform 
on the efficiencies. As more data becomes available in the future concerning the introduction 
of more reforms in specific countries, it will become possible to obtain a clearer picture of the 
effects of those initiatives as well. In particular, additional observations will enable tests for 
interaction effects between reform variables such that e.g. East-West differences can be 
tested.  
 
By using the MEA methodology we are, however, still able to obtain significant results given 
the current data availability, since MEA disaggregates the efficiencies on the various cost 
drivers. As a consequence we are able to detect significant efficiency improvements on at 
least one of the two input factors for most reform initiatives.  
 
Input specific efficiency scores can also be obtained using subvector Data Envelopment 
Analysis (see e.g. Färe et al. 1994), but while subvector DEA considers each input dimension 
separately (ceteris paribus) the MEA methodology estimates the input inefficiency in each 
dimension simultaneously and thereby utilizes the available information on input trade-offs as 
given by the shape of the production frontier. Furthermore, we have here introduced non-
discretionary variables into the MEA framework. 
 
While our methodological approach has enabled a more detailed investigation of the effects of 
the reforms on specific cost drivers, the overall picture is in line with previous studies (cf. 
 25
Section 2) in that the reform initiatives have positive impacts on operating efficiency. The 
literature to date, however, provides no clear conclusion regarding the net benefits of 
complete separation, yet this model is recommended by the EC (European Commission 
2001).  
 
We have here shown that there is a clear positive effect on operating efficiencies of the cost 
transparency following from accounting separation. But whether there is an additional benefit 
of complete separation, or whether the potential coordination problems outweigh the benefits, 
remains an unanswered question. It is, however, important to note that these two reform 
initiatives should be investigated separately, because otherwise the known positive effect of 
accounting separation is likely to be confounded in the effect of complete separation. A 
formal test of the specific additional effect of complete separation (over accounting 
separation) requires more observations from countries moving from accounting separation 
alone to complete separation (like France in 1997 and Norway in 1999).  
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